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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
GADDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Corporation, et al., 
Respondents, 
vs. 
CHARLES H. MORRISON, 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 
8188 
On the face of the complaint, this action appears to be 
an action to recover a brokers commission for the sale of 
certain real property. The appellant contends, and the evi-
dence supports such theory, that the real motive and un-
derlying purpose and effect of this action is to secure the 
aid and sanction of the Court in maintaining an insidious 
medium or channel through which the Real Estate Board 
may segregate people on the basis of race and color. 
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On August 1st, 1952, appellant listed his property with 
respondents for sale. On August 9th respondent found a 
prospective purchaser. This purchaser happened to be a 
Negro. After the earnest money contract had been signed 
by both parties, the abstract to the property disclosed that 
there was a covenant contained therein which forbade the 
sale of this property to negroes. Upon this discovery, the 
respondents immediately repudiated the transaction and 
refunded the earnest money to the buyers. The appellant 
was informed of this restriction and advised that he would 
have to await the approval of the real estate board before 
the sale could be completed. This the appellant refused to 
do and upon refusal of respondents to proceed with the sale, 
the defendant repudiated his listing contract with respon-
dents and made the sale himself. 
Several days after the property had been sold, the re-
spondents notified appellant that they had secured the ap-
proval of the real estate board and demanded a commission 
which the appellant refused to pay. 
The substance of the pleadings, evidence and findings 
of the court will be set forth in this brief. 
THE PLEADINGS 
The charging part of plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
alleges (R. 15) : 
"That the defendant is indebted to plaintiff's 
in the sum of $370.00 for services performed by 
plaintiffs for the defendant at his request on or 
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3 
about the 9th day of August, 1952, in and about the 
sale of certain real property, pursuant to a certain 
listing agreement signed by the defendant and dated 
August 1st 1952." 
The defendant filed his answer (R. 24-25) admitting 
the execution of the listing contract but denying the sale 
by plaintiffs, and further alleging, as an affirmative de-
fense thereto after setting forth the language of a restric-
tive covenant, alleging: 
"5. That upon the discovery of this covenant, 
the plaintiff's repudiated and abandoned their con-
tract to sell said property to Thomas C. Allen and 
refused to have anything further to do with said sale 
for the reason, and solely for the reason, that Thomas 
C. Allen was not a member of the Caucasian race." 
THE EVIDENCE 
Exhibit P-1 is the listing agreement between defendant 
and Knight Realty Co. There is no provision in this con-
tract which requires the defendant to submit a sale to 
colored people to the Real Estate Board for approval. If 
such a stipulation had been actually contained in this 
listing, it would be void and unenforcible, under the ruling 
in the Shelley vs. Krammer case. 
Exhibit P-2 expressly provides, lines 26-27: 
"This payment is received and offer is made 
subject to the written acceptance of the seller en-
dorsed hereon within one day from date hereof, and 
unless so approved the return of the money herein 
receipted shall cancel this offer without damage 
to the undersigned agent." 
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Exhibit D-3 provides, among other things as follows: 
page 19: 
"No part of the hereinafter described land shall 
during the life of this covenant be used, owned, oc-
cupied by or sold to, conveyed, leased, rented or 
given to any other person or persons other than 
those of the Caucasian race, excepting that this 
covenant shall not prevent occupancy by domestic 
servants of a different race or nationality employed 
by a tenant or owner. 
" 'These covenants shall run with the land 
and shall be binding upon all parties and all 
persons claiming under them until Jan. 1, 
1995'." 
On behalf of plaintiffs, Ben Boyce testified, ( R. 32) : 
"Q. Is the Gaddis Investment Company and 
Knight Realty Company, the other plaintiff, mem-
bers of what you call the Multiple Listing Board? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Real Estate Board of Salt Lake? 
"A. Yes sir." 
In describing what happened after Ex. p-2 was signed, 
Mr. Boyce said, (R. 35): 
"In the meantime, while he was gone, I went 
and got the abstract, and as I come in the office with 
the abstract, Mr. Gaddis says, 'You had better hold 
this deal up until I can get it cleared' or 'until we 
get it cleared.' I don't remember just his words 
* * *" 
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"Q. You told him to get it cleared you had to 
clear it by reason of what? 
"A. Well, Mr. Gaddis didn't explain to me. He 
said that there was some question about selling that 
place to colored people. 
"Q. That is the reason you wanted to get a 
clearance, was it? 
"A. That's right." 
On cross-examination Mr. Boyce testified, (R. 37): 
"Q. After you got the abstract you say Mr. 
Gaddis told you you had better hold the transaction 
up. Is that right? 
"A. Until it was cleared. 
"Q. Until what was cleared? 
"A. The property, give us permission to sell to 
colored people (R. 38). 
"Q. Who did you have to get permission from? 
"A. You will have to ask Mr. Gaddis that. 
"Q. You had Mr. Morrison's permission, did-
n't you? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. He was the only man involved in this par-
ticular piece of property, wasn't he? 
"A. As far as I know. 
"Q. He had the final say as to whether he 
wanted to sell or not, didn't he? 
"A. I guess he did." 
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In regard to the All ens getting their money back, Mr. 
Boyce testified, ( R. 42) : 
"Q. Do you know why they got it back? 
"A. Well, because, as I have said before, I told 
them we had to hold it up, and my time had expired 
as far as holding their money is concerned." 
Thomas E. Gaddis, Manager of Gaddis Investment Co. 
was called as a witness for defendant, and testified as fol-
lows, (R. 48): 
"Q. You also heard the testimony of Mr. 
Boyce with reference to your telling him to hold up 
that transaction? 
"A. I remember. 
"Q. Did you tell him to hold up that transac-
tion? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Why? 
"A. Under the ethics rule of the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards, they say that you 
-a realtor shouldn't sell any one into a district that 
might depreciate the district. As a result of that, 
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board has an ethics com-
mittee, and when there is any question about sell-
ing, that is, completing a sale, as far as we are 
personally concerned, why, we take it up to the real 
estate board ethics committee. I told Mr. Boyce-
"Q. May I ask, at the time that this transac-
tion came to your office, was there any question 
about that sale, that particular sale? 
"A. Purely the question of selling a colored 
man into a totally white man's district, if it was 
such. 
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"Q. And where did you discover that there 
was a question about selling to colored people? 
"A. There is always a question. 
"Q. Well-with reference to this particular 
transaction? 
"A. When the question came up to me, I told 
him that the people down there objected to some ex-
tent and had signed some kind of agreement which 
the lawyers told us was unconstitutional, but I 
would take it before the ethics committee. It would 
take a little time. I proceeded to do that. I took it 
before the ethics committee. They held it and ap-
proved the sale. It took about ten or fifteen days. 
They approved the sale to this gentleman here (re-
ferring to Thomas C. Allen) because I told Mr. 
Boyce to check the district, and I found either twelve 
or fifteen families, colored families in the district, 
and they thought it was alright to sell to a colored 
man in that district, so the sale was approved by the 
ethics committee of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
in writing. 
"Q. Well, now, is there anything in that con-
tract, that Exhibit P-2 that you have in your hand, 
that requires Mr. Morrison to wait until the real 
estate board or anybody else approves the sale of 
his property? 
"THE COURT: I think he wouldn't need to 
answer that. It would speak for itself. I don't un-
derstand-let me interrupt a minute Mr. Oliver. 
I don't understand whom you told that you would 
have to take it up with the ethics board. Was that 
Mr. Morrison? 
"A. Our salesman, Mr. Boyce. 
"THE COURT: Oh. Excuse me. 
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"Q. Did you talk to Mr. Morrison about this 
restriction? 
"A. I don't remember whether I talked to Mr. 
Morrison or not. I talked to Br. Boyce on it, and 
I believe Mr. Boyce talked to Mr. Morrison." 
In regard to the earnest money paid by the All ens, Mr. 
Gaddis testified, ( R. 50) : 
"Q. Did you advise your cashier or whoever 
handled the money to refund the earnest money to 
Mr. or Mrs. Allen? 
"A. I think I talked to Mr. Boyce and told 
him if the man demanded his money back he would 
have to give it to him, but we would still hold the 
seller to the contract * * * " 
Richard Waldis, salesman for Knight Realty, testified 
on behalf of defendant, (R. 59): 
"Q. You were advised by the office of the real 
estate-Salt Lake City Real Estate Board that the 
listing may be canceled, and you so advised Mr. 
Morrison, didn't you? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. And later, after the president returned 
and after the property had been sold, you were in-
formed that it couldn't be canceled? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. And you so advised Mr. Morrison? 
"A. That's right. 
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Mr. Waldis further testified, (R. 63) : 
"Q. And what did Mr. Knight say in regard 
to this transaction, whether it should be gone 
through with or canceled? 
"A. His only reaction was that he didn't want 
to be involved in it at all. 
"Q. But he did tell you that he didn't want 
to be involved in it at all? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Did he tell you why he didn't want to be 
involved in it? 
"A. No, he didn't say why. 
"Q. Do you know why? 
"A. It would only be an assumption." 
Marry Allen, one of the purchasers involved in the 
transaction, testified in regard to what took place (R. 68) : 
"Q. And what was that conversation? 
"A. Well, the conversation was that he could 
not sell this property to me, that I could come and 
get my money, because-it was something in the 
contract about being a covenant of some type and 
he was-they would probably discharge him from 
his job; lose his job over it. 
"Q. He would probably lose his job? 
"A. Uh huh. 
"Q. And you could come and get your money? 
"A. Come get my money. 
"Q. And what did you do after that? 
"A. I went and got my money." 
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On cross examination, Mrs. Allen testified, (R. 69) : 
"Q. Now, Mrs. Allen, wasn't your conversa-
tion that you had with Mr. Boyce in substance this, 
that he couldn't sell to you people until the matter 
was cleared? 
"A. He didn't state it. 
"Q. Are you positive? 
"A. I am positive he didn't because-
"Q. You say he told you he couldn't sell or he 
said he would lose his job? 
"A. Probably lose his job. 
"Q. Are you sure of that? 
"A. Yes." 
Mr. Allen testified as to the details of the conversa-
tions he had with the salesman (R. 71) wherein they dis-
cussed the problems of restrictions, and after signing the 
contract, he went back to Sunnyside, 150 miles away and 
left the closing of the deal up to his wife. 
The defendant testified in his own behalf, beginning 
(R. 72) wherein he gave a detailed account of the entire 
transaction, and at (R. 75) he testified: 
"Q. And did you have any conversation with 
Mr. Boyce or the Gaddis people about the selling of 
the property after you made your investigation? 
"A. Well, I asked them why it couldn't be sold. 
I said, 'It seems like I am willing, the people that 
want to buy is willing, and I really don't see any 
objections. We are the two principals.' 
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"Q. Who did you tell that to? 
"A. Mr. Boyce. 
"Q. And what did he say? 
"A. Well, he said that they couldn't go through 
with the sale until they had an okeh from the real 
estate board. 
"Q. And what did you say to that? 
"A. Well, I told him I couldn't see what the 
real estate board had to do with it. 
"Q. Then what did he say? 
"A. Well, he was pretty vague about it. He 
didn't want to go ahead and sell. He just said they 
would have to have an okeh from them before they 
could go through with it." 
The complete record of defendant's testimony is con-
tained in the Record, pages 72 to 80, which we respectfully 
request that the Court read in full. 
Elmer R. Smith was called as an expert in race-rela-
tions and sociology (R. 81 to 83). 
The purpose of this testimony was to show, as a matter 
of fact, that law suits of this type would have an adverse 
effect on the rights of minority groups to purchase property 
in the open market and aid the real estate interest and 
other racist in maintaining and perpetuating racial segre-
gation: 
"THE COURT (R. 82): I don't want to hear it. 
I don't think I need that. You can be excused Mr. 
Smith." 
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THE FINDINGS (R. 95) 
4. That on or about the 1st day of August 1952, the 
dependant entered into a written contract with the plaintiff, 
Knight Realty Company, and or its agents, wherein defen-
dant agreed to list his real property with plaintiffs for sale, 
and that if plaintiff procured a buyer for said real property, 
said defendant agreed to pay to plaintiff the regular com-
mission of 5% of the sale price of said property, and that 
said agreement was in force for a period of six months 
from date thereof. 
7. That on or about the 9th day of August 1952, the 
plaintiffs did procure a buyer for the defendant's real prop-
erty so listed for sale with the plaintiffs, for the sum of 
$7 400.00, and that said buyer was able and willing to buy 
said property, and pursuant thereto the defendant and said 
'buyer did enter into a written contract for the sale and 
purchase of said real property, and that said sale agreement 
was consummated and perfected, and said sale was made 
by the defendant to said buyer. 
There is no finding as to whether or not the listing 
contract was breached by respondents. There is no finding 
on the issue as to whether or not the defendant should have 
secured the approval of the real estate board. In short, 
there is no finding on the issues presented by the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Court, as an arm of the State, had no power 
to lend its aid to the scheme revealed by the evidence in 
this case. 
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2. The Court erred in excluding the proffer of Elmer 
R. Smith. 
3. The Court's findings do not reflect the evidence. 
4. The judgment is contrary to law and the evidence. 
To sustain this appeal the appellant relies on the fol-
lowing: 
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW 
I 
STATE COURTS CAN NOT BE USED TO 
ASSIST PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OR IN-
DIVIDUALS IN ABRIDGING THE PRIVI-
LEGES AND IMMUNITIES GUARANTEED 
TO CITIZENS UNDER THE 14TH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
II 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
FIND THE FACTS SPECIALLY AND STATE 
SEPARATELY ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THEREON. 
III 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE 
TESTIMONY OF ELMER R. SMITH. 
IV 
WHEN ONE CONTRACTOR REFUSES TO 
PERFORM ANY PORTION OF THE AGREE-
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MENT, THE OTHER MAY TREAT THE 
WHOLE CONTRACT AS ABANDONED. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
STATE COURTS CAN NOT BE USED TO 
ASSIST PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OR IN-
DIVIDUALS IN ABRIDGING THE PRIVI-
LEGES AND IMMUNITIES GUARANTEED 
TO CITIZENS UNDER THE 14TH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
Jackson vs. Barrows, 247 P. 2nd 99; 
Shelley vs. Krammer, 334 U. S. 1; 92 L. Ed. 
1161; 
Buckhannan vs. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 ; 62 L. Ed. 
149; 
Marsh vs. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 90 L. Ed. 
265; 
Art. I Sec. 1, Utah Constitution; 
Title 8 Sec. 42, U. S. Code. 
The substantive question presented here is whether a 
State Court can, consistantly with the Constitution, lend 
its aid and assistance to the Salt Lake Real Estate Board in 
its effort to circumvent and abrogate the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court. 
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Exhibit P-1 is the listing contract wherein the defen-
dant employed the plaintiffs to sell his property. The first 
paragraph of this contract provides: 
"In consideration of your agreement to list the 
property described on the reverse side of this con-
tract with the Multiple Listing Bureau of the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board, and to use reasonable ef-
forts to find a purchaser therefor, I hereby grant 
you for the period of six months from date hereof 
the exclusive right to sell or exchange said property 
or any part thereof, etc." 
Note the phrase "a purchaser''. It is not qualified by 
any terms requiring the approval of the Salt Lake Real Es-
tate Board, or its Ethics Committee or any other person or 
persons except the defendant. 
The evidence is clear and without conflict that the 
transaction was held up by the respondents because of, and 
solely because of, a restriction against selling this property 
to colored people. The respondents do not hesitate to state 
that under the ethics of their profession they will not sell 
colored people into a white man's district, (see R. 48, line 
22). 
The effect of this scheme, as it is practiced throughout 
the nation by real estate brokers would be to regiment and 
segregate minority groups, or what the majority may call 
undesirables, into ghettos and slum areas, just as effec-
tively as though the State had done so by legislation. 
Article I Section 1 Utah Constitution provides: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right 
to * * * acquire, possess and protect property 
* * * " 
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The last clause of Section 1, XIV Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides: 
"No state shall deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
The question of legislating segregation was put to rest 
in this country in the case of Buckhannan vs. Warley, supra, 
where the Supreme Court held a Louisville, Kentucky Ordi-
nance void. In Shelley vs. Crammer, supra, the same Court 
held that State Courts are an Arm of the State and, as such, 
can not be used to enforce private agreements between 
private citizens to violate the constitutional rights of other 
citizens. 
In Marsh vs. Alabama, supra, an Oil Company owned 
and operated a small community in which its employees 
lived. The Company made a rule that no literature or pam-
phlets or other advertisements should be distributed in the 
community without first getting permission from the man-
agement of the Company. Jehovah's Witnesses went into 
the community and distributed their literature without 
getting a permit from the management as required to the 
company's rules. The defendants were tried and convicted 
in the State Court on a charge of trespassing, in violation 
of the company's rules. In this case the U. S. Supreme 
Court held that the defendants had a constitutional right to 
distribute literature which could not be abridged or circum-
vented by any rules of a private corporation, and that the 
State Court could not be used to enforce such a rule. 
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At page 509 the court said : 
"When we balanced the constitutional rights of 
owners of property against those of the people to 
enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must 
here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter 
occupy a preferred position. As we have stated be-
fore, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded 
by the first amendment lies at the foundation of free 
government by men; and we must in all cases weigh 
the circumstances and appraise the reasons in sup-
port of the regulation of their rights. In our view 
the circumstance that the property rights to the 
premises when the deprivation of liberty, herein-
valved took place, were held by others than, the 
public is not sufficient to justify the States per-
mitting a corporation to govern a community of 
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties 
and the enforcement by the application of a State 
Statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to im-
pose criminal punishment on the appellant for un-
dertaking to distribute religious literature in a 
company town, its action cannot stand." 
As stated at the beginning of this brief, the restrictive 
covenant found in the chain of title to defendant's property 
lies at the foundation of this law suit, and by the same 
token that a state court cannot be used to enforce a com-
pany regulation prohibiting the distribution of literature 
in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens, we claim 
that the Salt Lake Real Estate Board may not use, what 
they call ethics, or by any other name which they may 
choose to call it, any device to circumvent and abrogate the 
rights of free people to contract freely with one another. 
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In the Shelley vs. Krammer case the direct question 
involved was whether or not the Covenant, per se, could be 
enforced in the courts; the court said no and since that time 
real estate interest and other racial bigots have sought ways 
means, techniques and devices through which the ruling of 
the court could be evaded. One of the common devices 
struck upon to accomplish this end is to sue the violator of 
the covenant for damages. Several such cases have reached 
the courts of last resort in several states. 
Jackson vs. Barrows, supra, is a California case where-
in this technique was resorted to. This case was decided 
in August, 1952, and all prior decisions from other juris-
dictions reviewed therein. 
In striking down this damage device, the California 
Court said, page 112 : 
"The doctrine of the Shelley case, as we read 
it, means that no State sanction, direct or indirect, 
can constitutionally be imposed for the breach of a 
restrictive covenant if such sanction would result 
in the denial of Civil Rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. Of all civil rights confered none is clearer 
and few more vital than the right to buy a home and 
live in it. Distinctions between direct and in-
direct State action is tenuous. The enforcement of 
a covenant by an action for damages furnished a 
potent motive to prevent use or occupancy of prop-
erty by non-caucasians ; that is, the indeminification 
of other property owners when a non-caucasian uses 
or occupies the property. The coercive device of 
retribution in the form of damages is as effective as 
the coercive effect of injunctive relief, although not 
as immediate. In addition to being subjected to a 
money judgment, the vexation and expense of a law 
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suit enhances the coercion. There can be no doubt 
that the threat to a covenantor of liability in dam-
ages, with consequent execution and sale, for dis-
regarding a racial restrictive covenant, would oper-
ate as a deterant to the breaching of its terms ; and, 
in the words of the Supreme Court of Michigan, 
would operate to inhibit freedom of purchase by 
those against whom the discrimination is directed. 
When a court undertakes to butress that threat by 
lending its power to give effect to the covenant, the 
court is facilitating the discriminatory purpose of 
the covenant and extending the full panoply of 
State power to its practical effectiveness. 
"'The fact that non-caucasian is not a party 
to the action does not effect the result. In an 
action at law for damages the rights and in-
terest of the particular non-caucasian would be 
secure and unaffected by any judgment render-
ed. However enforcement of the covenant would 
effectively deny non-caucasian citizens equality 
in the enjoyment of property rights because 
property owners in restricted areas are deterred 
from permitting use or occupancy by non-
caucasians * * * No person has the right, 
nor does the State have the power to require 
the enforcement of a covenant which will re-
sult in the denial to any individual of the equal 
protection of the laws. Any recognition of a 
racial restrictive covenant in an action in a 
State court constitutes prohibited State action.' 
"For emphasis, lets repeat that last sentence: 
"'Any recognition of a racial restrictive 
covenant in an action in a State Court consti-
tutes prohibited State action'." 
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As a fortress to the rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution, the Congress provided, U. S. Code, T.8 Sec. 42: 
"All citizens of the United States shall have 
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal 
property.'' 
At the trial, counsel for respondents admitted the law 
as enunciated herein, but contended that it is not applicable 
to this case because this is an action to collect a commis-
sion for the sale of property pursuant to a written contract, 
and not to enforce the terms of a restrictive covenant. But 
basically and fundamentally, this is erroneous. 
Courts can take judicial notice of economic and social 
conditions of the community in which they are located, 
Nat'l Bank vs. Beckstead, 250 P. 1033, therefore, this Court 
is cognizant of the fact that, for all practical purposes, the 
Salt Lake Real Estate Board has a monopoly on the sale 
andjor transfer of all real property in Salt Lake County, 
and for this Court to hold, as a matter of law, that every 
client that lists his property with any member or agency of 
said Real Estate Board is legally bound to have the approval 
of the Real Estate Board's ethics committee before he can 
sell his property to any person not of the caucasian race 
or be liable in a suit for a commission, then this Court, as 
an Arm of the State, will give its approval and sanction to 
a technique of the Real Estate Board through which it can 
segregate people solely on the basis of race and color, and 
it is the contention of appellant that this type of State sane-
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tions are inhibited by the Constitution, and the form of the 
action in which such sanctions are sought is wholly imma-
terial. 
In the first place the plaintiffs can not prevail upon 
their contract to sell because they breached that contract 
themselves. The breach of this contract is dealt with as a 
separate proposition in this brief. 
A casual review of the evidence reveals that the re-
strictive covenant is at the root of all this litigation. 
In the Barrows case at page 113, the court said: 
"An individual cannot consent to state court 
action the purpose and effect of which is to aid in 
discrimination based solely on race, to entrench seg-
regation, and thus deny to a class of citizens the 
equal protection of the laws. The law which pro-
hibits the end will not lend its aid in promoting the 
means designed to carry it into effect; it will not 
promote in one form that which it declares wrong in 
another." 
If it had not been for the covenant there would have been 
no controversy. If the proposed purchaser had been white 
there would have been no necessity for holding the transac-
tion up or getting approval from the Real Estate Board. 
But the proposed purchaser happened to be a negro and the 
property had that covenant in the chain of title, and thus 
we are, face to face with the proposition of whether or not 
the Brokers, Gaddis Investment Co., and Knight Realty 
Co., can force Morrison to seek the sanction of the Real 
Estate Board before he can sell his property to a colored 
person. This is exactly what Gaddis tried to do, but failed. 
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Under the law as pointed out herein Gaddis had no le·gal 
right to insist on Morrison violating the constitutional 
rights of the Aliens, and in this Gaddis breached his own 
contract thus giving Morrison a legal right to repudiate 
the whole contract and do as he pleased with his property, 
which he did. For the court to say that Gaddis Investment 
Co. had a legal right to insist that Mr. Morrison was bound 
to wait for the approval of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
before he could sell his property to Thomas C. Allen, for the 
reason, and only for the reason, that Thomas C. Allen was 
a Negro, is to approve of the policy of said real estate 
board in not selling colored people into a white man's 
district, and in this we respectfully submit that the state 
court is without power to grant such approval. 
II 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO-
FIND THE FACTS SPECIALLY AND STATE 
SEPARATELY ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THEREON. 
Rule 52 Utah Code 1953; 
Baker vs. Hatch, 257 P. 673; 
Baird vs. Irr. Co., 257 P. 1060. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Code provides: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts. without a 
jury * * * the court shall, unless the same are 
waived, find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry 
of the appropriate judgment." 
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This statute has been part of Utah law for many years 
and we don't propose to bore this court with authorities on 
its construction, suffice to say that at least on two different 
occasions, Baker vs. Hatch, 257 P. 673 and Baird vs. Irr. 
Co., 257 P. 1060, this court held: 
"It is the duty of the trial court in contested 
cases to find upon all material issues submitted for 
the decision unless findings are waived, and failure 
to so do is reversible error. 
III 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE 
TESTIMONY OF ELMER R. SMITH. 
The rule is well settled, that any evidence which proves 
or tends to prove or disprove any issue involved in a trial 
of a cause is admissable in evidence, and it is reversible 
error to exclude such testimony, and to burden this court 
with authority would be a reflection upon this court's in-
telligence. 
IV 
WHEN ONE CONTRACTOR REFUSES TO 
PERFORM ANY PORTION OF THE AGREE-
MENT, THE OTHER MAY TREAT THE 
WHOLE CONTRACT AS ABANDONED. 
Torrey vs. Shea, 155 P. 820; 
Chaffee vs. Widman, 108 P. 995. 
The Torrey case, supra, is a California case wherein 
the defendant contracted with the plaintiff for 40,000 tons, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
per year, of hops for a period of three years. The plaintiff 
delivered the required amount of hops the first year. The 
second year the plaintiff delivered only 26,000 tons, there-
upon the defendant cancelled his contract and got his hops 
elsewhere, and thereupon was sued by the plaintiff to re-
cover on the contract. 
After reviewing the evidence and the law with respect 
to breach of contract the court said : 
"This is so because the willful and inexcusable 
failure of one party to perform a material part of a 
contract on his part to be performed is tantamount 
to an abandonment of the entire contract ; and clear-
ly, if the plaintiffs in the present case so failed, they 
should not be permitted to recover damages for the 
refusal of the defendants to further comply with 
the contract." 
In Chaffee vs. Widman, supra, the Colorado court 
said: 
"But, as we have seen, this contract was aban-
doned, and, so far as disclosed by the record, without 
any collusion between tlie Widmans and the Hawk-
inses or bad faith on their part. When a broker 
opens negotiations, but fails to bring the prospective 
purchaser and owner together, and they are aban-
doned without fault of the owner, and the latter 
subsequently sells to the same party, without fur-
ther effort on the part of the broker, the owner is 
not liable to the broker for commissions." 
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CONCLUSION 
1. We have pointed out wherein the court has no 
power to lend it aid or sanction to maintaining and per-
petuating racial segregation by private industry or indi-
viduals through restrictive covenants, and wherein this 
action is designed for such nefarious effect. 
2. We have pointed out whereip. the court evaded the 
issue by failing to make specific findings of facts and con-
clusions of law based on the pleadings and evidence received 
on the trial of this cause. 
3. We have pointed out wherein the court erred in 
excluding the testimony of Elmer R. Smith. 
4. We have pointed out wherein exhibit P-1 does not 
provide for the finding of a buyer agreeable to the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board; exhibit P-2 does not provide for 
the approval of sale by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board. 
We have shown, without dispute, that the plaintiffs refused 
to make this sale without such approval. We have shown 
wherein the defendant was under no obligation whatsoever 
to seek or await the approval of said Real Estate Board 
and we have shown wherein the imposition of such a con-
dition by the plaintiffs constitutes a breach of, and aban-
donment of, their contract to sell and in this the defendant 
had a right to treat such a condition as a breach on the 
part of the plaintiffs and repudiate his contract with them 
and do as he pleased with his property. 
In this we respectfully submit that this cause should 
be reversed and rema,nded to the lower court with direc-
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tions to enter findings and conclusions in conformity with 
the evidence in this case and the opinion of this court and 
that said cause be dismissed with prejudice, with costs to 
appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. H. OLIVER, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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